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DURING  1973  and 1974  reductions  in supplies  of food (through  natural 
causes)  and of oil (through  unnatural  causes)  simultaneously  lowered  the 
real  income  of U.S. nonfarm  workers  and raised  the rate of inflation.  An 
inflation-cum-recession  induced  by lower  supplies  of raw  materials  may  call 
for  a policy  response  different  from  the traditional  tonic of demand  restric- 
tion  called  for  by a "garden-variety"  inflation  generated  by excess  demand. 
In  light  of the  novelty  of the 1974  situation,  the sharp  divergence  of policy 
recommendations  among  economists  is not surprising.  Some  analyzed  the 
episode  within  the context  of standard  macroeconomic  demand  analysis, 
treating  the 1973-74  acceleration  of inflation  as a delayed  consequence  of 
the  acceleration  in monetary  growth  during  1972,  and  the 1974-75  recession 
as a delayed  consequence  of the sharp  deceleration  in monetary  growth  that 
began  in June  1974.  The policy advice  of this group,  consisting  largely  of 
economists  generally  identified  as "monetarists,"  was to maintain  a con- 
stant  or even  slightly  reduced  rate  of growth  of the money  supply.'  Arthur 
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1. See Allan Meltzer,  "A Plan for Subduing  Inflation"  (a dialogue  between  Allan H. 
Meltzer  and two editorial  staff  members  of Fortune),  Fortune,  vol. 90 (September  1974), 
pp. 112ff.  In the same month, when the money supply (MI) had risen 5.8 percent  over 
the preceding twelve months,  Milton  Friedman  wrote:  ".  . . until a few months  ago at 
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Okun  put forth the contrasting  view that an attempt  by policymakers  to 
maintain  fixed  growth  in nominal  income  ignored  the "macroeconomic  ex- 
ternalities"  of commodity  shortages:  total real output  falls by more than 
the decline  in farm  output,  through  an extra  induced  loss of nonfarm  out- 
put.2  An implication  of Okun's  argument  is that,  while  stabilization  policy 
cannot  re-create  the lost farm  output,  it can minimize  or eliminate  the in- 
duced loss of nonfarm  output by promoting  a higher growth rate of 
nominal income. 
The inflation  in 1973  and 1974  can be regarded  as a combination  of an 
underlying  "hard-core"  inflation,  inherited  from the 1960s and perhaps 
aggravated  by the rapid  pace of economic  expansion  between 1971 and 
1973,  with  a set of four  temporary  "bubbles":  (1) the 1972-74  shortfall  of 
farm  supplies  to U.S. consumers,  caused  in the first  two years  by buoyant 
foreign  demand  and in the third  by domestic  supply  shortages;  (2) the re- 
striction  of oil production  enforced  by the cartel  of the Organization  of 
Petroleum  Exporting  Countries  (OPEC);  (3) the  end of price  and  wage  con- 
trols in 1974;  and (4) the devaluations  of the dollar in 1971 and 1973. 
Although  these  events  may have  permanently  raised  the price  level, such  a 
one-shot  rise  generates  only a temporary  increase  in the rate of inflation.3 
This paper  deals with the issues  raised  by an inflation  initiated  not by 
excess  demand  but by commodity  shortages.  Although  its formal  analysis 
treats  an external  shock  that  takes  the form  of a decline  in farm  output,  its 
basic  conclusions  apply  with  only  minor  changes  to the cases  of oil and de- 
valuation.  What  policies  are available  to minimize  the indirect  effects  on 
output?  What are the conditions  under which expansive  policy actions 
best, these high interest  rates have been accompanied  by extremely  high rates of mone- 
tary  growth....  Recent rates of monetary  growth  are not too low. If anything  they are 
still too high to bring inflation  to an end in a reasonable  period of time." See Milton 
Friedman,  "Is Money  Too Tight?"  Newsweek,  vol. 84 (September  23, 1974),  p. 82. Fried- 
man's  stand  on monetary  policy  was taken  despite  his  recognition  that special  factors  had 
contributed  to the 1974  inflation.  He attributed  roughly  half of it to increases  in oil and 
food prices,  to the lifting of price controls, and to precautionary  increases  against re- 
newed price  controls. See Milton Friedman,  "Inflation  Prospects,"  Newsweek,  vol. 84 
(November  4, 1974),  p. 84. 
2. Arthur  Okun, "Incomes  Inflation  and the Policy Alternatives,"  in "The Econo- 
mists Conference  on Inflation, September  5, 1974, Washington,  D.C.; September  23, 
1974,  New York, New York," vol. 1, "Report"  (1974; processed),  pp. 365-75. A formal 
analysis  of the externality  argument  is presented  below. 
3. The  list could perhaps  be expanded  by two smaller  bubbles-the increases  in prices 
in fear of reimposition  of controls, and the overshooting  of commodity  prices beyond 
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taken  to counteract  a temporary  decline  in farm  output  will  cause  a perma- 
nent  increase  in the rate  of inflation?  What  are  the relative  advantages  and 
disadvantages  of income-tax  reductions,  food subsidies,  and expansive 
monetary  policy  as policy  responses?  Finally,  how would  universal  escala- 
tion (or "indexation")  of wage  contracts  affect  the results  of the analysis? 
The  Polar  Cases 
To establish  the range  of possibilities,  the following  two sections  com- 
pare  the responses  of two hypothetical  economies,  one with perfect  flexi- 
bility  of prices  and wages  and the other  with absolute  rigidity  in the non- 
farm sector.  These cases serve to illuminate  the more complicated  and 
relevant  analysis  of a realistic  economy  in which  nonfarm  prices  and  wages 
are  neither  perfectly  flexible  nor absolutely  fixed. 
PERFECT PRICE FLEXIBILITY 
The  economy  encounters  no problems  in adjusting  to an external  shock- 
say, a crop failure-if both farm  and nonfarm  prices  and wages  are per- 
fectly  flexible.  In this case the market  for nonfarm  goods and  labor  always 
clears,  and  no involuntary  unemployment  can  arise.  A brief  examination  of 
this case serves  as a point of comparison  with the diametrically  opposite 
case of fixed  prices. 
The treatment  of all cases incorporates  several  common assumptions. 
The  economy  is closed,  with  all output  of both sectors  produced  and con- 
sumed  in the domestic  economy.  Farm  output  is exogenous,  produced  by a 
factor  that  is not mobile  between  the two sectors  and consumed  entirely  in 
the nonfarm  sector.  The exogenous  supply  of farm  output,  QFI  is equated 
to the demand: 
(1)  QF  =  AN  (PN') 
where  A is a constant,  ao is the nonfarm  income  elasticity  of demand  for 
farm  products,  a, is the  absolute  value  of the  price  elasticity  (which  through- 
out the paper  is assumed  to be less than  unity),  and  PF and  PN are,  respec- 
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(1) relates  the market-clearing  relative  price, PF/PN,  to the exogenous 
supply  of farm  output  and the level of nonfarm  output,  QN: 
(2)  PF=  [AQN  } 
Ni  QF 
For any given supply  of farm products,  an increase  in nonfarm  output 
raises  the demand  for farm  products,  and hence  the relative  price,  by an 
amount  that  depends  positively  on the income  elasticity,  ao,  and  negatively 
on the  price  elasticity,  a,. The  relative  price  depends,  in part,  on the  level of 
nonfarm  output,  except  in the special  case of a zero  income  elasticity. 
Nonfarm  output  is assumed  to be produced  with labor  and some other 
fixed  factor,  like capital.  Knowledge  and technology  is assumed  fixed,  so 
that  labor  input  determines  nonfarm  output.  Given  the population,  if the 
supply  of labor  does not respond  to changes  in the real wage,  both labor 
input  and  nonfarm  output  are  fixed.  In this case,  a crop  failure  changes  the 
relative  price  of farm  products  but not the level of nonfarm  output.  Since 
the wage  rate  that nonfarm  firms  can afford  to pay to a given  number  of 
workers  is limited  by nonfarm  prices,  any increase  in the relative  price  of 
farm  products  reduces  the real wage  of workers,  when  the latter  is defined 
in terms of a consumer  price index including  both farm and nonfarm 
products. 
If, however,  a lower  real  wage  causes  workers  to reduce  their  labor  input, 
either  by withdrawing  from  the labor  force  or by working  fewer  hours  per 
week,  a crop failure  must reduce  nonfarm  output.4  This response  in the 
nonfarm  labor  market  thus provides  a second  relationship  between  non- 
farm  output  and  the relative  price  of farm  products,  in addition  to equation 
(2) above, allowing  the simultaneous  determination  of both variables.5 
Hence,  output  and relative  prices  in each sector  are  beyond  the control  of 
4. A third  case, not discussed  here, is a negatively  sloped labor supply curve. Most 
cross-section  evidence  for the United States  appears  to support  a vertical  curve  for adult 
male workers,  a positively  sloped response of women and teenagers  to an increase  in 
their own real wage, and a negative  response  of wives to an increase  in their husbands' 
real wage. See the evidence  cited in Robert J. Gordon, "The Welfare  Cost of Higher 
Unemployment,"  BPEA (1:1973), table 2, p. 159. 
5. The exact form of the second relationship  is 
zkPF~~~~_  0-(-1)  /(b+e) 
V PN  / 
where  D is a constant,  k is the share of farm products  in consumer  expenditures,  and b 
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policymakers.  If the choices  of individuals  between  leisure  and labor are 
socially  accepted,  any reduction  in employment  caused  by the voluntary 
withdrawal  of labor  input  in response  to a lower  real  wage  is of no concern 
for stabilization  policy,  since  that reduction  is purely  voluntary. 
What, if anything,  can stabilization  policy accomplish  when nonfarm 
prices  are  perfectly  flexible?  Aggregate-demand  policy  controls  the level of 
nominal  income  (that  is, gross  national  product  in current  dollars),  which  is 
sufficient  to set the nominal  nonfarm  price  level since  the values  of all real 
variables  have  been  determined.  If policymakers  follow  a rule  that  calls  for 
constant  nominal  income,  then  a crop  failure  must  cause  nominal  nonfarm 
prices  to fall,  but  the overall  average  price  level must  rise.6  If, on the other 
hand,  policymakers  achieve  constant  overall  prices  by reducing  nominal  in- 
come,  they would  prevent  a redistribution  of income  from creditors  and 
pensioners  to debtors.  Even  if the  expected  rate  of inflation  and  the level of 
the interest  rate  are unaffected,  the higher  the price  level, the smaller  the 
fraction  of income  a debtor  will require  to service  his debts. 
Whether  or not the labor supply  shrinks  in the flexible-price  case, the 
welfare  of nonfarm  workers  is reduced.7  Not only  does  a crop  failure  reduce 
total  real  output,  but also, as long as the demand  for farm  products  is price 
inelastic,  it transfers  income  from  workers  to farmers,  who  enjoy  a windfall. 
While  the problem  is not one of stabilization,  society  might  wish  to reduce 
or eliminate  the transfer  by a redistributive  tax policy that, for example, 
levies a windfall-profits  tax on farmers  to finance  a subsidy  on nonfarm 
products  purchased  by nonfarm  workers.  However,  the case  for redistribu- 
tive  tax-subsidy  schemes  is not obvious,  nor  is there  an obvious  line  between 
temporary  events  justifying  redistribution  and those that do not. 
COMPLETE WAGE AND  PRICE  RIGIDITY 
In the case of perfect  price  flexibility,  nonfarm  output  is either  fixed  or 
determined  by workers'  decisions  about  labor  supply,  leaving  the nonfarm 
price  level  to be determined  by stabilization  policy. If, on the other  hand, 
6. The nonfarm  price  level falls if the price  elasticity  of demand  for farm products  is 
(approximately)  less than unity;  the overall  price  level must rise, because  real output  has 
fallen  and nominal  income is assumed  constant. 
7. Although  workers  who reduce  labor  input obtain  leisure  worth  the real wage  at the 
margin,  they  lose part  of their  producers'  surplus  earned  on inframarginal  units of work. 
In parallel  fashion, farmers  gain a producers'  surplus  from the increase  in the relative 
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the nonfarm wage rate is rigid and nonfarm prices are "marked up" over 
the wage rate by a constant fraction, then nonfarm prices are fixed and non- 
farm real output is determined by stabilization policy. 
Nominal income, Y, is the sum of total nominal spending in each sector: 
(3)  Y=  PFQF  +  PNQN; 
equation (2) can be substituted into (3) to obtain 
(4)  YIPN  =  [A  QNaOQF  (1  a1)](la1)  +  QN* 
When nominal income is held fixed by a policy rule, the wage rate and 
nonfarm prices are rigid, and the demand for farm products is income and 
price inelastic (a0 <  1 and a,  <  1), then nonfarm output varies in the same 
direction as farm output, even if the supply of nonfarm labor is completely 
unresponsive  to chan.ges  in the real wage. Since the value of farm output rises 
and nominal income is fixed, the value of nonfarm output must fall. With 
nonfarm prices rigid, nonfarm output must drop, causing involuntary un- 
employment. The crop failure thus carries  with it a real "multiplier"  effect. 
Just as stabilization policy can alter nominal nonfarm spending and the 
price  level of the nonfarm sector in the flexible-price  case, so it can alter that 
sector's nominal spending, real output, and employment in the rigid-wage 
case. 
In this extreme case, the multiplier can be derived when the market- 
clearing condition for farm output, (2) above, is written in the form of 
percentage changes: 
(5)  PF  PN  aqF  +  aoN 
where lower-case  ps and qs denote percentage changes between the initial 
situation and the new situation after the crops have failed: 
PF  =  (PFI  -  PFO)/PFO. 
If policymakers  hold nominal income constant, the change of nominal in- 
come-that  is, a weighted average of spending in the two sectors as defined 
in (3) above-must  be zero: 
(6)  Y  =  s  = k(PF +  qF) +  toa  k)peN  +  qS), 
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into  (6) yields,  after  some  rearrangement,  the  percentage  change  in nonfarm 
output  relative  to the exogenous  change  in farm  output: 
(7)  q.N_ =  k(l  -  a,) 
qF  kao +  (1-k)ala 
To take  a simple  example,  assume  that  the initial  share  of expenditure  in 
the farm  sector,  k, is 10 percent,  and that the income  and price  elasticities 
are,  respectively,  zero  and  20 percent  (ao =  0 and  a, =  0.2).  In this  case  the 
elasticity  of nonfarm  output  to a change  in farm  output  is 4/9. With  initial 
levels  of expenditure  of $100  billion  and $900  billion  in the  two sectors,  a 10 
percent  loss in farm  output  ($10 billion)  causes  a 4.44 percent  decline  in 
nonfarm  output  ($40 billion).  Thus the social cost, C, of the $10 billion 
crop  failure  is 
(8)  C =-[kq,  +  (1-  k)q,]Y  =  ak 
_  $10 billion =50  bilion. 
-  0.2  =$0blin 
Since  the nonfarm  price  level is rigid,  policymakers  can fully offset  the 
multiplier  effect  of the crop  failure  on nonfarm  output  with  no deleterious 
side  effects.  Nominal  income  must  simply  increase  sufficiently  to leave  non- 
farm  output  unchanged  by the crop failure.  This "fully  accommodating" 
policy  response  can be calculated  from  (6) when  qN (as well as  PN) is equal 
to zero: 
k(1 -  a,) 
(9)  y =  k(p  +  q,)  =-q  al 
With  the parameters  of the previous  example,  nominal  income  should  be 
raised  by 4 percent-$40 billion-to counteract  the $40  billion  loss of non- 
farm  output  that would  have occurred  had nominal  income  been allowed 
to remain  fixed. 
The  consumer  price  index,  an average  of the fixed  nonfarm  price  and  the 
higher  farm  price,  must  rise,  and policymakers  cannot  avoid  accepting  this 
higher  overall  price  level,  just as they cannot  re-create  the lost crops.8  But 
8. A positive  value  for the income  elasticity  of demand  for farm  products  reduces  the 
multiplier,  since lower nonfarm output moderates the iilcrease in the relative price 
needed  to clear  the farm output  market,  and this in turn releases  more of the fixed  level 
of nominal  income  for the support  of nonfarm  output. When  ao = 0.2, the elasticity  of 
nonfarm  output  is reduced  from 4.44 to 4.0 percent,  the social cost from $50 billion to 
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stabilization  policy  can  eliminate  the wasteful  "multiplier"  loss in nonfarm 
output  and associated  involuntary  nonfarm  unemployment  by providing 
enough  extra  nominal  income  to make  room for both the original  level of 
nonfarm  spending  (fixed  price  and initial  real output)  and the higher  level 
of spending  on farm  products.9 
Partial  Price  Adjustment 
NO COST-OF-LIVING  EFFECT ON WAGES 
At this  point  the  policymaker  is torn  between  the  conflicting  advice  of the 
flexible-price  model,  which  recommends  a reduction  in nominal  income  to 
stabilize  the  price  level,  and  that  of the  rigid-price  model,  which  recommends 
an increase  in nominal  income  to avoid involuntary  unemployment.  The 
simplest  intermediate  model allows  the rate of change  of nonfarm  prices 
(PN,  where  small  letters  now denote  percentage  changes  per  unit of time)  to 
adjust  by a fraction,  X,  of the difference  between  the market-clearing  value 
of the flexible price,  N,  and the current price, PN: 
(10)  PN =  X(PN -PN) 
When  nominal  income  is held  constant,  &N  during  the period  of the crop 
failure  lies  below  the  initial  nonfarm  price  level  (PNo)  and  the  rate  of change 
of nonfarm  prices  is negative  until  they  are  brought  into line with  PN. Since 
PNO  lies above the market-clearing  value,  N,  the initial consequence of the 
crop  failure  is a decline  in nonfarm  output  and  the creation  of involuntary 
unemployment,  as in the rigid-price  analysis of the previous section. 
Through  time,  however,  downward  adjustment  of the nonfarm  price  level 
makes  more of nominal  income available  for nonfarm  output, and the 
severity  of the recession  is gradually  mitigated.  Finally,  PN ends  its decline 
when  it reaches  its market-clearing  level,  N, at which  point  involuntary  un- 
employment  is eliminated.  The  process  is reversed  when  the crops  return  to 
normal;  at the low nonfarm  price  level,  N,  the constant  level of nominal 
income  allows  nonfarm  output  to rise  above  its initial  value,  and  an output 
and  employment  "boom"  continues  until  PN has returned  to PNO 
The temporary  recession,  as well as the subsequent  temporary  boom in 
9. Nonfarm  output  might  have  fallen  as in the flexible-price  case if the supply  of labor 
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output,  can  be eliminated,  as described  in the previous  section,  by a policy 
of accommodating  nominal  income.  If nominal  income is raised  by the 
amount  calculated  in equation  (9), the market-clearing  value  of PN during 
the  period  of the crop  failure  is by definition  equal  to the initial  price  level, 
PNO  and no downward  adjustment  in nonfarm  prices  takes place. Now 
a policy  of accommodating  nominal  income  imposes  on society  the cost of 
a higher  price  level  than  one that aims  at constant  nominal  income,  and a 
more  substantial  (albeit  temporary)  redistribution  from  creditors  and  pen- 
sioners  to debtors.  The  choice  between  the policies  has no long-run  conse- 
quences  for the level of prices  or output,  or for the rate of inflation.10 
SOME COST-OF-LIVING  EFFECTS ON WAGES 
The previous  section assumes  that higher farm prices have no direct 
effect  on nonfarm  wages  and  prices,  and thus  ignores  the possibility  that a 
policy  of accommodating  nominal  income  may permanently  increase  the 
rate of inflation.  As a point of departure  for developing  a more realistic 
mechanism  for  adjusting  nonfarm  prices,  which  allows  for  the  possibility  of 
an equilibrium  nonzero  inflation  rate,  (10) may  be reformulated  as 
(I11)  PN  P  +  jZ5 
where  pN*  is the rate  of change  of the expected  nonfarm  price  level,  Z is the 
excess  demand  for  labor,  and] is an adjustment  coefficient.  Assume  that  the 
expected  level of nonfarm  prices  remains  constant  (p,  =  0) after a crop 
failure;  then,  so long as the price  level  is above  its market-clearing  value- 
PN >  P.T in (10)-the resulting  involuntary  nonfarm  unemployment  means 
thatZ <0  in(1). 
Equation  (11)  is simply  an "expectational  Phillips  curve,"  the properties 
of which  have received  extensive  analysis  and empirical  testing  in recent 
years.  A slightly  more  complicated  but substantially  more  realistic  version 
can be developed  if (ignoring  productivity  change)  it is assumed  that the 
rate of growth  of the wage rate, w, is equal  to that of the expected  price 
level plus a fraction,  j, of the excess  demand  for labor,  Z: 
(12)  w=p*+jZ. 
The  expected  price  level  relevant  for  wage  decisions  is a weighted  average  of 
10. Such consequences  might ensue to the extent that the recession-inducing  policy 
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the  expected  nonfarm  price,  PN,  which  defines  the  value  of labor's  marginal 
product,  and the expected  consumer  price index, P*, adjusted  for the 
payroll-tax  factor,  T*,  used  by workers  to calculate  their  real  after-tax  wage 
rate.  Thus  (12) becomes11 
(13)  w -  g(PZ +  t)  +  (I 
When  the coefficient  g is greater  than zero, the wage rate depends  not 
only on the nonfarm  product  price,  but also on farm  prices  and the pay- 
roll  tax rate.  In the extreme  case,  when  g has a value  of unity,  all of the in- 
crease  in consumer  prices  relative  to nonfarm  product  prices  resulting  from 
a crop  failure  is passed  through  to the wage  rate,  and  real  wages  do not fall. 
NVhen  the wage  equation  is interpreted  as the adjustment  path in a neo- 
classical  model  of the labor  market,  the parameter  g is the ratio  of the elas- 
ticity  of the  labor  supply  curve  to the sum  of that  elasticity  and  the  elasticity 
of the  demand  curve,  and  is zero  when  the supply  of labor  does  not respond 
to changes  in the real wage.12  But in alternative  labor  market  settings  the 
value  of g might  be nonzero  even if labor were supplied  inelastically.  In 
unionized  industries,  for instance,  the strike  weapon  might  be used  to pass 
through  some or all of an increase  in farm  prices  in higher  wages.  Quite 
apart  from  unions,  competitive  firms  might  offer  risk-averse  employees  a 
wage  contract  indexed  to the consumer  price  index,  trading  this real-wage 
insurance  for a reduction  in the average  real  wage.13  The following  analysis 
11. Equation  (13) has been estimated  in Robert J. Gordon, "Inflation  in Recession 
and Recovery,"  BPEA  (1: 1971),  table 1, equation  (11). The equation  has also been used 
in empirical  work  for the United Kingdom  by Michael  Parkin  and his collaborators  and 
has been derived  explicitly  in Michael  Parkin,  Michael  T. Sumner,  and R. Ward,  "The 
Effects  of Excess  Demand,  Generalized  Expectations,  and Wage-Price  Controls  on Wage 
Inflation  in the U.K.," in Karl Brunner  (ed.), a conference  volume  on controls  (Amster- 
dam: North-Holland,  1975),  forthcoming. 
12. A more  complex  version  with several  varieties  of taxes, cyclical  variations  in pro- 
ductivity  growth, and other complications,  is analyzed in Robert J. Gordon, "Inter- 
relations  between Domestic and International  Theories of Inflation,"  in R. Z. Aliber 
(ed.), The  Political  Economy  of Monetary  Reform,  forthcoming. 
13. The idea of "wage insurance"'  as an explanation  of rigid wages was developed 
simultaneously  and independently  by C. Azariadis,  "Implicit  Contracts  and Underem- 
ployment,"  Journ2al  of Political  Economy,  vol. 83 (1975), forthcoming;  Martin  N. Baily, 
"Wages  and Employment  under  Uncertain  Demand,"  Review  of Economic  Studies,  vol. 
41 (January  1974), pp. 37-50; and Donald F. Gordon, "A Neo-Classical  Theory of 
Keynesian  Unemployment,"  in Karl Brunner  and Allan Meltzer (eds.), The Phillips 
Curve  and Public Policy, Carnegie-Rochester  Conference  Series, vol.  1 (Amsterdam: 
North-Holland,  1975). Robert  J. Gordon  193 
will discuss  the consequences  of different  values  of g as though  they  result 
from  an expectational  mechanism  in wage  bargaining,  but the interpreta- 
tion could  readily  be adapted  to cover  other  cases. 
An equation  for  the  price  of output  in the  nonfarm  sector  is now  required. 
In line with considerable  evidence,  the nonfarm  price level is set as a 
"'markup  fraction"  multiplied  by "standard"  unit labor  cost-that  is, the 
wage rate divided  by productivity  at some "standard"  level of capacity 
utilization-with  the size  of the markup  fraction  dependent  on the demand 
for commodities.14  Assuming  a constant  level of standard  productivity 
(equal  to 1.0),  the price  equation  becomes 
(14)  PN=  wxc, 
where  X is an index  of excess  commodity  demand  and c is the percentage 
response  of the inflation  rate  to the rate of growth  of output. 
When  the wage  and  price  equations  are  combined  with  the definition  of 
consumer  prices, 
(15)  PC  =kp-k) 
a relationship  between  changes  in nonfarm  and farm  prices  is obtained: 
(16)  PN =  (1 -  gk)p* +  g(kp* +  t*) + jZ +  cx. 
As in equation  (11),  the basic  force  that allows  involuntary  unemployment 
to persist  is the partial  downward  adjustment  of prices  in the face  of excess 
labor  (and commodity)  supply.  What difference  is made by a value of g 
greater  than  zero?  The analysis  is identical  to that of (11), of course,  if the 
expected  farm  price  is unaffected  by a temporary  increase  in the actual  level. 
On  the other  hand,  a crop  failure  may  lead  individuals  to revise  upward  the 
level  of farm  prices  that  they  expect  during  their  wage  contracts  (in 1972-74, 
U.S. domestic  food  consumers  had "three  lean  years").  In this  case  a "wage 
push"  is exerted  by farm  prices,  which  raises  the nonfarm  price  level above 
the adjustment  path  described  by (10) and  (11),  in turn  "using  up"  more  of 
the fixed  level of nominal  income,  raising  the multiplier,  and aggravating 
the recession. 
If g is positive  and if expected  farm  prices  respond  to the higher  actual 
level,  the  results  depend  on how expectations  adjust  to price  changes  in the 
nonfarm  sector.  One  possibility  is that  expectations  adapt  to past  changes  in 
14. See the evidence  presented  in Gordon, "Inflation  in Recession and Recovery," 
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nonfarm  prices.  The expected  level of nonfarm  prices  for the next period 
would  then be set equal to the current  level extrapolated  by an expected 
rate of nonfarm  inflation  estimated  from its past rate. Just after a crop 
failure,  such  adaptive  nonfarm  expectations  would  worsen  inflation,  since 
nonfarm  price  expectations  would  be raised  in response  to the higher  cur- 
rent  price  level  caused  by the  feedthrough  of farm  prices  to wages.15  And,  if 
nominal  income  is held  constant,  the  higher  level  of nonfarm  prices  worsens 
the  initial  stages  of the  recession.  But  soon the adjustment  of nonfarm  price 
expectations  would  begin  to operate  in the opposite  direction,  reducing  in- 
flation  and  the  magnitude  of the  recession,  since  it would  amplify  the down- 
ward  adjustment  of nonfarm  wages  and prices  in response  to excess  labor 
supply. 
In short,  adaptive  nonfarm  price  expectations  amplify  the  fluctuations  in 
nonfarm  output  and  prices  in response  to a crop  failure  as long as nominal 
income  is held  constant.  If, on the other  hand,  policymakers  pursue  a fully 
accommodating  policy  for nominal  income,  which  prevents  the emergence 
of  excess  labor  supply,  adaptive  expectations  raise  expected  nonfarm  prices- 
the "base"  around  which  the adjustment  of prices  takes  place-and endow 
the economy  with a permanently  higher  price  level. So long as the crop 
failure  is temporary,  the rate  of inflation  is not permanently  affected,  since 
the decline  in farm  prices  at the end of the failure  feeds  through  to expecta- 
tions  and  ends  the upward  adjustment  of expected  nonfarm  prices.  But an 
accommodating  policy for nominal  income would  permanently  raise the 
rate  of inflation  in the  case  of a permanent  supply  reduction,  brought  about, 
for example,  by an eternal  oil cartel. 
The  Potential  for Tax Policy 
In any realistic  case, a policy accommodating  nominal  income  (such  as 
an increase  in the money  supply  sufficient  to eliminate  the nonfarm  multi- 
plier  effect  of a crop  failure)  has the disadvantage  of raising  the price  level 
15. Corresponding  to (7) above is a multiplier  formula that takes into account the 
feedthrough  of farm prices to wages (but not the effect on prices of excess labor or 
commodity  supply): 
fN  =  k[(l  -ai)(1  -gk)  +g]  l 
qF  aogk +  [kao  +  (1 -  k)al](1 -  gk) f 
Compared  to the case a,  = 0.2, ao = 0.2, and g = 0, which yields an elasticity of 0.4, 
the 0.2 value for g (assumed  in the simulation  below) increases  the elasticity  to 0.492. Robert J. Gordon  195 
relative  to an  alternative  policy  aimed  at constant  nominal  income.  Changes 
in tax rates  and subsidies,  on the other  hand,  not only operate  on income 
but also can directly  alter  the price  level. A reduction  in the payroll  tax 
rate,  for instance,  narrows  the "wedge"  between  market  prices  and after- 
tax  factor  cost,  and  hence  allows  firms  to charge  a lower  price  while  paying 
workers  the same  after-tax  wage  rate.  Along with  a reduction  in tax rates, 
policymakers  must take steps (cutting government  expenditures  or the 
money  stock,  for example)  to maintain,  as I shall assume,  an unchanged 
path  of nominal  income.16 
A reduction  in taxes  will  lower  consumer  prices  most if applied  to those 
taxes  whose  burden  is borne  by consumers  rather  than factors  of produc- 
tion. At one extreme,  changes  in state  sales  taxes  are  probably  shifted  for- 
ward  to consumer  prices  by nearly  100  percent,  while  at the other  extreme, 
changes  in the corporation  income  tax affect  mainly  capital  income  and do 
not appear  to be substantially  shifted  forward.17  The  personal  income  tax is 
an intermediate  case and appears  to be shifted  forward  to consumers  by 
roughly  20 percent.18  In the absence  of a universal  federal  sales tax, the 
policy  option  that would  yield  the greatest  reduction  in prices  for a given 
loss  of revenue  would  be a federal  government  bribe  to induce  reductions  in 
state  and  local sales  taxes.  If this mechanism  were  rejected  as administra- 
tively  clumsy  or politically  infeasible,  the federal  government  could  subsi- 
dize  nonfarm  output  to offset  the impact  of the higher  farm  prices  on the 
consumer  price  index.19  A constant  nominal  income  would  thereby  be suffi- 
cient  for both the higher  farm-price  level needed  to clear  that market  and 
the original  level of nonfarm  output,  since  the after-subsidy  nonfarm  price 
would  be pushed  down  to the market-clearing  level,  PN. The size of the re- 
quired  subsidy  relative  to GNP is given  by equation  (9)-for  instance,  $40 
billion  in the simple  example  spelled  out above. 
Possibly,  such a subsidy  could be financed  by a windfall-profits  tax on 
16. In principle,  if no offsetting  action  is taken,  the price  level may be either  raised  or 
lowered.  See Alan S. Blinder,  "Can Income  Tax Increases  Be Inflationary?  An Expos- 
itory Note," National  Tax Journal,  vol. 26 (June 1973),  pp. 295-301. 
17. Robert  J. Gordon,  "The  Incidence  of the Corporation  Income  Tax in U.S. Manu- 
facturing,  1925-62,"  American  Econiomic  Review,  vol. 57 (September  1967),  pp. 731-58. 
18. See Gordon, "Inflation  in Recession and Recovery,"  table 1, where the tax co- 
efficient  refers  to the personal  income  tax plus the social security  tax paid by employees. 
19. A subsidy  for farm products  would raise demand  above the reduced  supply  and 
hence  would  be infeasible  without  a commodity  inventory  or buffer  stock. A subsidy  for 
nonfarm  products  would not require  higher  nonfarm output than initially, but would 
simply  offset  the multiplier  effect and allow the original  full employment  level of non- 
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farmers  if society  felt this temporary  event  justified  income  redistribution. 
Another  alternative  would  be bond finance,  which  would redistribute  in- 
come  from  future  generations  to present  ones. Still  another  solution  would 
be  the  establishment  of a "price  stabilization  fund"  that  would  pay  nonfarm 
subsidies  in years  of low farm  production,  financed  by a nonfarm  sales  tax 
in years  of bumper  crops  and  low farm  prices.20  Symmetric  supply  fluctua- 
tions  would  allow  this  remedy,  but  asymmetric  events  like  those  engendered 
by the OPEC  oil cartel  would  not. 
The  Inflationary  Consequences  of an Accommodating  Policy 
A nonfarm  subsidy  appears  to be almost  ideal in principle,  eliminating 
involuntary  nonfarm  unemployment  and averting  most (but not all) of the 
increase  in consumer  prices.21  But its rapid  implementation  may pose ad- 
ministrative  or political  issues,  and its financing  raises  difficult  problems. 
An alternative  is an accommodating  policy for nominal  income, which 
could  eliminate  involuntary  nonfarm  unemployment  at the cost of a higher 
price  level. 
A rough  numerical  estimate  of these inflationary  consequences  is pre- 
sented  in figure  1. A simple  model  has been  simulated  to illustrate  the con- 
sequences  of a hypothetical  10  percent  decline  in farm  output  lasting  twelve 
quarters.  The model consists of the farm market-clearing  equation  (2) 
combined  with  the nonfarm  price  adjustment  equation  (16).  The simulated 
response  of the rate of wage increase  to excess  labor supply  is relatively 
slight,  as U.S. evidence  suggests,  but  excess  commodity  demand  is assumed 
to have a substantial  impact  on nonfarm  prices  relative  to wages.  Other 
parameters  are identical  to those used in the multiplier  examples  in the 
previous  section  (details  are spelled  out in the appendix). 
The "basic"  simulation,  A, illustrated  by the solid  line  in figure  1, shows 
that a crop failure  accompanied  by a policy of constant  nominal  income 
creates  a recession,  the severity  of which  gradually  eases  as nonfarm  prices 
adjust  downward  in response  to excess  supply.  The "optimistic  accommo- 
dation"  simulation,  B, assumes  that  policymakers  raise  nominal  income  to 
maintain  the original  level  of nonfarm  output  and  that  the  expected  level  of 
20. Inventories  of farm products  are ruled out by the assumption  that the supply 
shock is sufficiently  severe  to exhaust  them. 
21. See note 6 above, 0 
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farm  prices  is adjusted  upward  to the higher  actual  farm  price,  but that in- 
dividuals  maintain  their  expectations  about  nonfarm  prices.  The "pessimis- 
tic accommodation"  simulation,  C, assumes  that  the expected  level of non- 
farm  prices  is adjusted  adaptively  to all changes  in actual  nonfarm  prices, 
whether  associated  with  temporary  or permanent  events.  Simulation  B il- 
lustrates  that  an accommodating  policy  buys  full  employment  at the cost of 
a temporary  increase  in the price  level and in the rate of inflation;  but it 
permits  more deflation  after  the crops  return  to normal,  leaving  the con- 
sumer  price  index  the  same  ten years  after  the  initial  shock.  In simulation  C, 
the inflation  rate increases  by more  than it does in the optimistic  case but 
nevertheless  temporarily;  the consumer  price index is permanently  in- 
creased  by almost  4 percent  as the result  of the gradual  upward  adjustment 
of the expected  rate of nonfarm  inflation  during  the period of the crop 
failure. 
The Consequences  of Wage  Indexing 
The computer  simulation  program  can also be used  to evaluate  the con- 
sequences  of an external  shock  for  an economy  in which  wages  are  indexed. 
Wage  indexing  can be represented  by a new wage  equation  to replace  (13): 
(17)  w=PC+jz. 
The  rate  of change  of the real  wage  rate  (w -  Pc) now depends  only on ex- 
cess  labor  demand.  By increasing  the stability  of the  real  wage,  wage  index- 
ing  makes  wages  and  prices  more  responsive  and  real  output  less  responsive 
to "nominal"  shocks-that is, variations  in monetary  growth.  At the same 
time,  however,  the built-in  rigidity  of the real  wage  impedes  the economy's 
adjustment  to "real"  shocks,  which  require  a change  in the real  wage.22  In 
(17)  the reduction  in the  real  wage  needed  to clear  the market  for farm  out- 
put calls for a deeper  recession  with  indexing  than without. 
Figure  2 contrasts  the path of the consumer  price  index and nonfarm 
output  in the basic  nonindexed  simulation  A from  figure  1 with  two index- 
ing  simulations.  The  behavior  of the  wage  rate  under  indexing  is represented 
by (17), adjusted  to make  the current  rate  of wage  change  equal  to the rate 
22. The sentence  summarizes  the major  conclusion  of Jo Anna Gray, "Wage  Indexa- 
tion: A Macroeconomic  Approach,"  working  paper  (University  of Chicago,  April 1975; 
processed). 0  0 
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of change  of the CPI in the previous  period, adjusted  for that period's 
excess  labor  demand.  Curve  D in figure  2 traces  the  effects  of wage  indexing 
when  policymakers  hold nominal  income  constant.  The increase  in farm 
prices  during  the crop failure  feeds through  much more completely  to 
wages  and nonfarm  prices  when  wages  are indexed,  using  up more of the 
fixed  nominal  income  and  requiring  a much  more  substantial  decline  in real 
output  (reaching  a maximum  of nearly  15  percent)  than  in the  basic  simula- 
tion. Eventually,  the deep recession  brings  down the price level, freeing 
more of nominal  income  to support  real output.  When the crop failure 
ends,  a very  large  excess  demand  for labor  develops.  In short,  wage  index- 
ing makes  both prices  and unemployment  substantially  less stable when 
nominal  income is held constant  in the presence  of an external  supply 
shock. 
As before,  policymakers  can  raise  nominal  income  to accommodate  both 
higher  farm  prices  and  the original  level of nonfarm  output.  But this  policy 
has very serious  inflationary  consequences  under  wage indexing,  since it 
prevents  the emergence  of the excess  labor supply  required  in the lagged 
version  of (17)  to lower  the real  wage.  As illustrated  by curve  E in figure  2, 
the result  is a geometric  increase  in the consumer  price  index  (a steady  6.0 
percent  quarterly  rate of inflation)  until farm output  returns  to its initial 
level  in the thirteenth  quarter,  by which  time  the consumer  price  index  has 
doubled.  Only  a bumper  crop  or a policy-induced  recession  can  reverse  the 
process  and bring  the consumer  price  index  back down. 
Summary  and  Conclusions 
This  paper  analyzes  the  response  of a simple  two-sector  economy  to a de- 
cline in output  in an external  sector  where  the price  is assumed  to clear 
markets.  Its major  conclusions  are, first,  that no problems  arise  if wages 
and  prices  in the internal  sector  instantly  fall to clear  the market.  Any re- 
duction  in employment  is purely  voluntary.  The optimal  policy  is a reduc- 
tion in nominal  income  to hold the aggregate  price index constant  and 
avoid  a temporary  increase  in its level. 
Second,  when  nonfarm  wage and price  levels are absolutely  rigid,  and 
when  nominal  income  is held  fixed,  the supply  reduction  in the external  sec- 
tor has a multiplier  effect,  causing  a recession  and involuntary  unemploy- 
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exceeds  the  value  of lost external  output  by  the  value  of the  nonfarm  output 
that  is squeezed  out. The optimal  policy  is an increase in nominal  income 
designed  to accommodate  both the higher external  price level and the 
original  level of internal  output;  a temporary  increase  in the aggregate 
price  level  cannot  be avoided  since  the internal  price  level is fixed. 
Third,  when  wages  and  prices  are  partially  responsive  to excess  labor  and 
commodity  demand  but wages  do not respond  directly  to higher  external 
prices,  the  initial  effect  of the  external  supply  reduction  is the same  as in the 
rigid-price  case.  If nominal  income  is held constant,  a recession  will con- 
tinue  until  the nonfarm  price  has fallen  to its market-clearing  level. As in 
the rigid-price  case, the recession  can be avoided  by an accommodating 
policy  for  nominal  income,  which  temporarily  (but  not permanently)  raises 
the price level compared  with the case when nominal income is held 
constant. 
Fourth,  when  wages  and prices  are partially  responsive  to excess  labor 
and commodity  demand,  and in addition  external  prices  feed through  di- 
rectly  to wages,  the inflation  and recession  caused  by the external  supply 
shock  are  both aggravated.  A policy  aimed  at an accommodating  nominal 
income  raises  the price  level temporarily  but not permanently  higher  than 
would  one of nonaccommodation  if expectations  of the nonfarm  price  level 
do not extrapolate  the inflation  that occurs  during  the period  of the supply 
reduction.  On the other  hand,  adaptive  nonfarm  expectations  would  cause 
the price  level  (but not the rate  of inflation)  to remain  permanently  higher 
when an accommodating  policy is pursued.  Moreover,  in the event of a 
permanent  reduction  in supply  (such  as one  enforced  by an unbreakable  oil 
cartel),  a policy of accommodating  nominal  income would raise perma- 
nently  the rate  of inflation  of the consumer  price  index. 
For the case  of the temporary  crop  failure,  a superior  policy  in principle 
would  be a subsidy  to nonfarm  products  that  would  avert  both  the  recession 
entailed  by nonaccommodation,  and the higher  price  level required  by ac- 
commodation.  The  major  obstacles  to a subsidy  are  the administrative  and 
political  difficulties  of its prompt  implementation,  and the costs of financ- 
ing it. 
Finally,  the analysis  of this paper raises serious questions  about the 
merits  of the  full  indexation  of wage  contracts,  which  would  shorten  the  lag 
in the adjustment  of wages  to changes  in external  prices  and  would  thus  in- 
hibit  the decline  in the real wage  required  by an external  supply  shock.  If 
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omy,  any  external  shock  will destabilize  both prices  and output  more  than 
it would in an unindexed  economy.  Any attempt  to accommodate  the 
higher  prices  by raising  nominal  income  under  indexing  will impose  on the 
economy  a substantially  higher  inflation  rate  for the duration  of the exter- 
nal supply  reduction.  These  disadvantages  of wage  indexation  seem to me 
persuasive,  but do not weaken  my previously  stated  support  for fully in- 
dexed  government  bonds,  tax exemptions,  and tax brackets. 
APPENDIX 
Model Used  for Simulations 
IN THIS  DESCRIPTION  of the model, superscripts  refer to sectors, and sub- 
scripts  to time  periods.  (The  basic  parameter  assumptions  and  their  justifi- 
cations  are  listed  at the  end of this  appendix.)  Farm  output,  Q', depends  on 
its base-period  level, adjusted  by a percentage  crop failure,  v: 
(A-1)  Q' =  (1 - v)QF. 
From  (2) in the text, 
(A-2)  pF  =  pN  [A(QN)ao/  QF  Ia,. 
From  (13), 
(A-3)  w =  *  +  jZPN  1 +  g(kpF +  t) 
where  the  expected  farm  prices  and  the  tax  rate  are  set at their  actual  values, 
and  the  symbols  are  as defined  in the  text  equations.  With  the  rate  of growth 
of output  as a proxy  for the rate of growth  of excess  commodity  demand, 
from  (14): 
(A-4)  Pt=  wt +  cqt_l. 
The consumer  price  index  is 
(A-5)  pc=  kPF +  (1-k)Pv. 
(I have omitted  equations  that convert  levels to rates  of growth,  and vice 
versa.).  ,When expectations  are adaptive,  the expected  level of nonfarm 
prices  is extrapolated  from  the actual  level of the previous  period  by an ex- 
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weights  from  my "Inflation  in Recession  and Recovery,"  table  A-1, trun- 
cated  to the first  ten values  and constrained  to add to unity: 
/N  10 
(A-6)  p  pN  =  +EUiPN  -+  Pt (  ij  +  U~tt, 
where  the ui are  the weights.  The expected  farm  price  level,  Pr,  is always 
equal  to its actual  value,  pt. 
In the simulations  that hold nominal  income, Yt,  constant,  the level of 
nonfarm  output  is a residual,  and  labor  demand  fluctuates  by a fraction,  n, 
of the change  in output,  while  labor  supply  is assumed  constant: 
(A-7)  Qt=  (Y  t 
therefore,  the excess demand for labor, Zt, is 
(A-8)  zt  =  Zt-1(l  +  nqN). 
In the simulations  that vary  nominal  income  to hold real nonfarm  output 
constant,  (A-7) and (A-8) are replaced  by 
(A-9)  y  =  PFQF + PrQN 
and 
(A-10)  zt = 0. 
In the simulations  of wage  indexing,  (A-3) is replaced  by 
(A-1)  wt = PCU1  +jZt-. 
The  basic  parameter  assumptions  and their  justifications  are as follows: 
a,, the price  elasticity  of demand  for farm  products,  is 0.2, a value  sug- 
gested  to the author  by Dale E. Hathaway.  Hathaway  also suggested  0.2 as 
a value  for the income  elasticity,  ao. 
v, the percentage  reduction  in farm  output,  is 0.10, an arbitrary  choice. 
j, the percentage  change  in wage growth  for a change  of 1 percentage 
point  in the excess  demand  for labor,  is set equal  to 0.13, to correspond  to 
the more pessimistic assumption in Tobin's recent BPEA paper.23 (Note, 
however,  that  Tobin  allows  for no reaction  in the price  equation.) 
g, the  response  of wage  change  to changes  in farm  prices,  is 0.2, roughly 
consistent  with my evidence  in "Inflation  in Recession  and Recovery," 
table  1. 
23. James Tobin, "Monetary Policy in  1974 and Beyond," BPEA (1:1974), pp. 
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c, the percentage  response  of the inflation  rate  to the rate of growth  of 
output,  holding  wage  growth  constant,  is 0.15. This implies  that a 10 per- 
cent reduction  of output  relative  to trend  reduces  the price-wage  ratio by 
1.5  percent.  This  is somewhat  larger  than  the 1.0 percent  estimate  implied 
by the coefficient  on the ratio  of unfilled  orders  to capacity  in "Inflation  in 
Recession  and Recovery,"  because of my finding  that the transactions 
prices  of producers'  durable  goods  are  flexible  relative  to the  list prices  used 
in that earlier paper. See my Measurement  of Durable Goods Prices (Na- 
tional  Bureau  of Economic  Research,  1975),  forthcoming,  chapter  5. 
k, the share  of the farm  sector  in initial  spending,  is 0.10, an arbitrary 
choice. 
n, the share  of a change  in output  taking  the form of a change  in labor 
input,  is set at 0.5, allowing  half of the output  fluctuation  to be reflected  in 
productivity. 
Discussion 
WILLIAM  POOLE questioned  the relevance  of Gordon's  shock model to 
the actual  situation  of 1973-74.  Poole pointed  out that, historically,  going 
back  to the 19th  century,  serious  inflations  normally  have  been led by pri- 
mary  products.  These  commodities  are traded  in highly  competitive  mar- 
kets and  their  supply  elasticities  are relatively  low in the short  run.  More- 
over,  inventory  speculation  plays  a major  role  in the determination  of their 
prices.  For these  reasons,  particularly  large  increases  in the prices  of pri- 
mary  products  are  a classic  phenomenon  of inflation.  In Poole's  judgment, 
the historical  record  at least raises questions  that Gordon had not an- 
swered  before  assuming  that agricultural  shortages  and the like played  an 
unusual  role in the 1973-74  experience.  In response,  Gordon  emphasized 
that  the shortfall  in crops  and  the actions  of the oil cartel  were  observable 
phenomena  of recent  years  that  properly  could  be regarded  as shocks.  The 
fact that these shocks  impinged  on a world  with high levels of aggregate 
demand  may dilute,  but does not eliminate,  the relevance  of the shock 
model. 
Another  major  reservation  about the Gordon  model was expressed  by 
Martin  Feldstein.  He noted  that wage  rigidities  were  the basic  reason  that Robert J. Gordon  205 
shocks  produce  recession  in Gordon's  model,  and  argued  that  these  rigidi- 
ties reflect  the expectations  of labor  and management  with  respect  to gov- 
ernment  policy.  Basically,  wages  are rigid  because  private  decisionmakers 
bet that the government  will not let unemployment  get so high as to pull 
down wages.  Gordon's  proposed  policy of accommodating  shocks  by al- 
lowing  nominal  income  to grow  faster  would  strengthen  these  expectations, 
intensifying  the  downward  rigidities  and  making  it even  harder  to deal  with 
new shocks. 
Several  discussants  raised  questions  about  how uncertainty  of forecast- 
ing the  exogenous  sectors  affected  Gordon's  findings.  John  Kareken  called 
attention  to the analytical  problem  of incorporating  disturbances  from 
stochastic  variables  like agricultural  supplies  into a comparative-statics 
model which  essentially  has no room for uncertainty.  William  Brainard 
agreed  that stochastic  models  were  needed  to evaluate  policy strategies  to 
anticipate  shocks.  But  he viewed  Gordon's  paper  as a constructive  attempt 
to assess  the ability  of policy  to respond  to shocks  after  they are known. 
He pointed  out that, once a crop is harvested,  some policy actions can 
influence  the price  level during  the next year,  even though  a fully optimal 
response  would depend  upon the expected  crop. Michael  Wachter  sug- 
gested  that the recent  record  of agriculture  could be viewed  as a string  of 
three  shortage  shocks  in a row. It is tempting  to accommodate  each  one of 
them  individually  as specific  and  transitory  shortages  to ease  their  impact; 
but a succession  of such decisions  accommodates  inflation. 
Some  contrasting  opinions  were  expressed  about  the nature  of wage  be- 
havior  insofar  as it influences  the value of the g coefficient  in Gordon's 
model.  Robert  Hall  inferred  from  recent  U.S. wage  behavior  that food and 
fuel  prices  had  not fed through  into wages.  The  real  price  of land and  raw 
materials  has risen  in relation  to real wages,  just as supply  and demand 
shifts  dictated.  James  Tobin  agreed  with  Hall  that one did  not observe,  and 
should  not have  expected,  a major  escalation  of money-wage  increases  as a 
result  of rises  in the prices  received  by entrepreneurs  (like farmers  and oil 
producers)  who were  not hiring  labor.  In fact, the employers  of American 
labor  did  not have  the wherewithal  to pay  major  increases  in wages.  But  he 
stated  that  neither  the empirical  nor analytical  evidence  demonstrated  that 
the coefficient  was  zero  rather  than  some  small  fraction-like the 0.2 value 
that  Gordon  used  illustratively  in his paper. 
Franco  Modigliani  cautioned  that the behavior  of real wages  gave no 
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items  not produced  by labor.  Even  if that  pass-through  was  sizable,  as long 
as all prices  adjusted  rapidly  and fully to increases  in wages,  real wages 
would  continue  to be squeezed  by the price  rises  in the exogenous  sectors. 
He pointed  to his own empirical  results,  which  showed  some effect  of the 
price  of wholesale  foodstuffs  on nonfood  consumer  prices,  as evidence  that 
some influence  (although  not a terribly  strong one) prevails  in reality. 
Feldstein  thought  that  the  recent  moderation  of wage  increases  might  indi- 
cate  that  labor  and  management  had  made  the same  mistake  as economists 
in underpredicting  inflation.  If they  expected  the food and fuel inflation  to 
be temporary,  their  failure  to pass those price  increases  into wages  would 
be understandable. 
Gordon's  negative  verdict  on wage indexation  interested  a number  of 
participants.  In Brainard's  view, wage indexation  had undesirable  effects 
in Gordon's  model partially  because  wages are linked  to a cost-of-living 
index  that  includes  imports,  food, and  the  like. If the price  index  comprised 
only  items  made  by domestic  workers,  the results  could be quite  different 
and  more  favorable.  Granting  that such a form of indexation  would  offer 
less  insurance  on real  wages  to workers,  Brainard  thought  that  labor  could 
recognize  that  real  wages  cannot  be maintained  in the face of major  price 
increases  in the exogenous  sectors.  Modigliani  strongly  supported  Brain- 
ard's  suggestion,  contending  that, for many purposes  of indexation,  the 
price  index  used for escalation  should  be restricted  to value added  in the 
private  nonfarm  sector.  Hall felt that this was likely to approximate  an 
indexing  of wages  by other  wages,  given  the preponderance  of wage  costs 
in private  nonfarm  value  added. 
Marina  Whitman  noted  that Gordon  attributed  a dual  function  to fiscal 
policy-influencing  the cost as well as the demand  side of the economy. 
This  dual  influence  raised  the  possibility  that  an excise  tax cut, for  example, 
could  bring  down unemployment  and yet have enough  cost-reducing  in- 
fluence  to curb  inflation.  She wondered  whether  it could ever be clear  in 
the real world  that the cost-reducing  element  of any tax cut would out- 
weigh  its demand-raising  effects.  Joseph  Pechman  elaborated  on this  point, 
stressing  that the weapons  in the arsenal  of fiscal policy that can most 
readily  exert  cost-reducing  effects  are novel and thus far have been politi- 
cally  unsalable. 